Abstract-Self-healing key distribution mechanism can be utilized for distributing session keys over an unreliable network. A self-healing key distribution scheme using bilinear pairings is proposed in this paper. As far as we know, it is the first pairingbased authenticated self-healing key distribution scheme. The scheme achieves a number of excellent properties. Firstly, the users can check the integrity and correctness of the ciphertext before carrying out more complex key recovery operations thus fruitless work can be avoided. Secondly, the scheme is collusionfree for any coalition of non-authorized users. Thirdly, the private key has nothing to do with the number of revoked users and can be reused as long as it is not disclosed. Finally, the storage overhead for each user is a constant.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the significant issues in wireless networks is how to securely distribute session keys for group communication.
There have been two mainstream ways on addressing the above issue. One is aiming at the design of key distribution for reliable networks. The other is aiming at the design of key distribution for non-reliable networks. Most of existing schemes suppose that underlying networks are reliable. However, how to distribute session keys for unreliable wireless networks, in a manner that is resistant to packet loss, is an issue that has not been addressed deeply.
In an unreliable network, the key distribution broadcast for a particular session might never reach some users. Requiring retransmissions would contribute to the traffic on the network which might already be heavily burdened. Especially, when communication group size is large, such re-transmissions could potentially exhaust the group manager. In addition, in some high security environments, it is suggested that only sending essential messages lest they make themselves vulnerable by revealing their location. Self-healing key distribution schemes enable large and dynamic groups of users over an unreliable network to establish group keys for secure communication. The goal of self-healing key distribution schemes is that even if in a certain session the broadcast is lost, the group users are still able to recover the session key from the broadcasts received before and after the session. Hence, noninteractive self-healing key distribution solutions are not only favorable but also necessary.
Self-healing key distribution appears to be quite useful in several settings in which session keys need to be used for a short time-period, due to frequent changes in the group structure. Military-oriented applications as well as Internet application [1] , such as broadcast transmissions, pay-per-view TV, are some important examples which can benefit from such approaches. In addition, the self-healing method may be useful in commercial content distribution applications or electronic services in which the contents are highly sensitive.
In this paper, we will propose an authenticated self-healing key distribution scheme based on bilinear pairings. The main contribution of this paper is highlighted by the following properties:
• It is the first time to deal with self-healing key distribution scheme using pairing-based cryptology.
• It is the first time to address the authentication on self-healing key distribution scheme using efficient short signature.
• The scheme is collusion-free for any coalition of nonauthorized users.
• The private key has nothing to do with the number of revoked users and can be reused as long as it is not disclosed.
• The storage overhead for users is a constant. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section II, we present an overview of earlier works in the area of selfhealing key distribution, ID-based cryptography and bilinear pairing, and short signature. In section III, we briefly introduce the preliminaries to be used in the design of self-healing key distribution protocol. In section IV, we give system parameters firstly and present concrete construction secondly. In section V, we analysis the security of the proposed scheme and make efficiency comparison with previous protocols. We conclude the paper in the last section.
II. RELATED WORKS

A. Self-healing Key Distribution Schemes
The notion of self-healing key distribution was introduced by Staddon et al. in [1] . Formal definitions, lower bounds on the resources as well as some constructions of self-healing key distribution scheme were proposed in it. Since then, selfhealing key distribution has been one of the hot research topics. Liu et al. generalized the definitions in [1] and gave some constructions in [2] . The scheme reduced communication overhead and storage overhead by introducing a novel personal key distribution technique. Subsequently, many works on self-healing key distribution were done in terms of improving efficiency or entitling some special features. More et al. in [3] used a sliding window to address the three problems in [1] . The three problems were inconsistent robustness, high overhead and expensive maintenance costs. Sáez in [4] considered the possibility that a coalition of users sponsor a user outside the group for one session. Muhammad et al. in [5] considered the possibility of idea of mutual-healing.
All of these schemes ([1]- [5] ) took it for granted that the broadcast messages arrive the destination without any change. However, broadcast messages delivered over low-cost broadcast channels easily suffer from substitution and distortion attacks. This results in the additional requirement that the members must authenticate the integrity and correctness of the received broadcast messages.
Jiang et al. in [6] used TEK (Traffic Encryption Key) to prevent non-legitimate nodes from having access to the secret broadcast contents. TEK is re-keyed periodically instead of every node topology change thus there exists time delay. In dynamic communication group, session key must be updated on each membership change. Time delay will violate the forward and backward security of the scheme. Han et al. considered encrypting broadcast messages by TEK thus the integrity of broadcast messages can be kept. Two constructions of TEK were proposed in [13] . While both of them have shortcomings. The first construction introduces too much computation overhead for the group manager. The second construction does not fit for the new users.
B. Identity-based Cryptography and Bilinear Pairing
In 1984, Shamir [7] introduced the notion of ID-based cryptography to alleviate many of the problems inherent with managing certificates. Since then, many ID-based cryptographic schemes have been proposed using the bilinear pairing. In 2001, Boneh and Franklin in [8] proposed the first practical identity-based encryption scheme. Inspired by the idea of [8] , Du et al. proposed a broadcast encryption scheme for key distribution in [9] . In this paper, we extend the broadcast encryption scheme for key distribution to a self-healing key distribution scheme.
C. Short Digital Signature
Short digital signature are essential to ensure the authenticity of messages in low-bandwidth communication and lowstorage and less computation networks. Many short digital signature scheme have been proposed so far. One of the famous short signature scheme is BLS scheme which is introduced by Boneh et al. in [10] . This scheme is based on the CDHP (Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem) on elliptic curves and can be acquired from the private key extraction process of Boneh-Franklin's ID-based encryption scheme [8] . Shortly after that, Boneh et al. in [11] proposed another short signature scheme where signatures are almost as short as the former without random oracle model under a strong Diffie-Hellman problem assumption. Zhang et al. in [12] improved BLS scheme by substituting special hash functions with general cryptography hash functions. The security of this scheme relies on Inv-CDHP (Inverse Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem), which is a variation of CDHP, based on bilinear pairing. This scheme requires less pairing operation than BLS scheme thus more efficient. Our authenticated self-healing key distribution scheme adopts Zhang's short signature.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly describe the bilinear pairing, Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption and ID-based Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
A. Bilinear Pairing and Related Assumption
Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic groups of order q for some large prime q. G 1 is a cyclic additive group and G 2 is a cyclic multiplicative group. We assume that the discrete logarithm problems in both G 1 and G 2 are hard. Let e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 be a pairing which satisfies the following conditions:
• Non-degeneracy: There exists P ∈ G 1 and Q ∈ G 1 , such that e(P, Q) = 1; • Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(P, Q) for any P, Q ∈ G 1 .
1) BDH Parameter Generator:
A BDH parameter generator IG is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter 0 < k ∈ Z, runs in polynomial time, and outputs the description of two groups G 1 and G 2 of the same order q and the description of an admissible bilinear map e :
DLP, CDHP, and Inv-CDHP are defined in the additive group G 1 . According to Theorem 1 in [12] , CDHP and Inv-CDHP are polynomial time equivalent. 1) Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP): Given two group elements P and Q, to find an integer n ∈ Z * q , such that Q = nP when such an integer exists. 2) CDHP: For a, b ∈ Z * q , given P, ap, bP , to compute abP . 3) Inv-CDHP: For a ∈ Z * q , given P, ap, to compute a −1 P . 4) BDHP (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem): Given P, aP, bP, cP for some a, b, c ∈ Z * q , computes e(P, P ) abc ∈ G 2 . 5) BDH Assumption: There is no polynomial time algorithm to solve the BDH problem.
B. ID-Based Public Key Infrastructure
ID-based PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) involves a trusted KGC (Key Generation Center) and users. Users' private keys are calculated by KGC and sent to them privately. The basic operations consist of Set up and Private Key Extraction. When we use bilinear pairings to construct IDbased private/public keys, the operations can be implemented as follows: KGC runs BDH parameter generator to generate two groups G 1 , G 2 and a bilinear pairing e :
It chooses an arbitrary generator P ∈ G 1 and defines two cryptographic hash functions:
* .
• Set Up: KGC chooses a random number s ∈ Z * q and sets P pub = sP . Then KGC publishes system parameters e(H(m)P + P pub , S) = e(P, P ).
The process of verification is as following:
IV. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
A. Parameters
Let U = {u 1 , . . . , u n } be the finite universe of users. Each user u i has a unique identifier ID i . A broadcast unreliable channel is available, and time is defined by a global clock. GM (Group Manager) sets up and manages, by means of joining and revoking operations, a communication group which is a dynamic subset of users of U . GM has public key P pub and private key s as aforementioned. m denotes the number of sessions. Let G j ⊆ U be the communication group established by the group manager in session j. Each node is preloaded with a public/private key pair (Q i , S i ) before the deployment of networks. The public/private key pair is used to recover the session keys as long as u i is not removed by GM from the group. Let R j ⊆ G j−1 denotes the set of revoked group users in session j and J j ⊂ U \ G j−1 denotes the set of users who join the group in session j with R j ∩ J j = φ. Hence,
Moreover, for j ∈ {1, . . . , m}, the session key K j is randomly chosen by GM and according to uniform distribution. For any non-revoked user u i ∈ G j , the j-th session key K j is determined by broadcast information B j and its personal pbulic/private key pair (Q i , S i ).
B. Construction
The authenticated self-healing key distribution scheme proposed in this paper is a computational security scheme. It includes several procedures. In the procedure of Broadcast, GM will sign the ciphertext which is used to recover session keys. Subsequently, at the beginning of Key Recovery, the users check the integrity and correctness of the ciphertext first. If the ciphertext is changed during the process of delivering, the group users will discard it.
1) Setup: GM obtains both public system parameters and all the public keys of possible users from ID-based PKI. GM chooses m session keys K 1 , · · · , K m from Z * q . The session keys are independent to each other and according to uniform distribution.
2) Broadcast: Suppose |G j | denotes the number of users in session j. For each session 1 ≤ j ≤ m, according to the public keys of users in the session group G j , GM computes
Let a i represents the transpose of a i . GM also constructers |G j | − 1 auxiliary keys
which means
The broadcast message is then formed by computing, for a random r j ∈ Z * q ,
The ciphertext for j-th broadcast in the following form:
GM signs the broadcast message as Sign j = 1 H(Bj )+s P . The signature is Sign j . Finally, GM broadcasts the ciphertext together with the signature to the set of users G j .
3) Key Recovery: When a user u i ∈ G j receives the ciphertext B j and signature Sign j , it verifies the signature by computing e(H(m)P + P pub , Sign j ) like the following step:
If e(H(m)P + P pub , Sign j ) = e(P, P ), it discards the incorrect message. Otherwise, it sets a vector a 1 = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) with |G j | elements, and only the i-th element is 1. Then A j is a |G j | × |G j | matrix
The user u i can solve the following system of equations using Cramer's Rule or other algebraic methods.
With (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x |Gj | ), u i gets
In order to decrypt the ciphertext, user u i needs to compute e(P pub , r j Q V1 ), which with knowledge the private key S i it can do via:
Then, u i can recover the session key
4) Self-healing: Without loss of generality, suppose u i lost the broadcast message for a session t < j. As far as it belongs to the session group G t , it picks up the polynomial z t from broadcast message B j and forms the |G t | × |G t | matrix A t as operations in the procedure of Key Recovery. Then, u i solves the following system of equations. (1, 1, . . . , 1) .
With
After that, with the knowledge of its effective private key S i , u i computes e(P pub , r t Q V1 ).
Finally, u i recovers the lost session key:
If more than one broadcast messages get lost, the operations of session keys recovery is the same as aforementioned.
5) Adding and Revoking User:
If GM wants to add a new user u new to session j, in the procedure of Broadcast, GM constructs a new (|G j | − 1) × |G j | matrix and computes new
If GM wants to revoke a user u rov in session j, what GM should do is constructing a new (|G j | − 1) × |G j | matrix and
The adding and revoking operations are very efficient in our scheme. There is no interaction between the GM and other group members. For the condition that more than one user joining or revoking, the operations preform as aforementioned.
V. ANALYSIS OF PERFORMANCE
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed scheme firstly. Then we analyze the efficiency of the proposed scheme in terms of storage overhead, computation overhead and communication overhead.
A. Analysis of Security
According to the Construction described in Section IV, we can say that our construction realizes an authenticated self-healing key distribution scheme using bilinear pairings. It is the first time to address the authentication on broadcast messages in self-healing key distribution scheme using short signature. This scheme is simple and avoid the deficiencies that incurred by [6] and [13] . According to the exact security proofs for the signature scheme in [12] , the signature is secure under the random oracle model. In the procedure of Key Recovery, the receivers will first check the validity of the signature. If the verification fails, the broadcast message must be changed during the transmission. The receivers will not waste time on the useless broadcast message.
While in general self-healing key distrusting scheme without augmentation, the users do not know whether the recovered session keys are correct or not.
The scheme is collusion-free for any coalition of nonauthorized users. In this scheme, if a user wants to obtain session keys, it should compute e(U 1 , x 1 S i ) in the procedure of Key Recovery. Therefore, only the authorized users can recover the session key. In addition, due to the difficulty of DLP, any coalition of non-authorized users can not derive the private keys of authorized users from their public keys. Furthermore, session keys are independent to each other and according to uniform distribution, which subsumes forward security and backward security of the scheme.
In previous secret sharing-based self-healing key distribution schemes, the personal key could be reused on the condition that less than the threshold number of users were revoked. In this paper, private key has nothing to do with the number of revoked users and can be reused as long as it is not disclosed. In addition, our scheme enables a user to recover from a single broadcast message all the session keys for which it belongs to the associated session groups.
B. Analysis of Efficiency
Different from the previous papers, we take advantage of a broadcast encryption and short signature to design a selfhealing key distribution scheme. As far as we know, it is the first paper of pairing-based authenticated self-healing key distribution scheme. In this section, we analyze the efficiency of the scheme.
There is a reasonable assumption that the group manager takes up more resource than ordinary users thus can store more information and perform more complex computation as well as communication. This is the reason that in the process of efficiency analysis, we only elaborate on analyzing the various overheads for ordinary users.
In terms of storage overhead, each user only stores its public/private key pair. Therefore, the storage overhead for each user is a constant. Because H 1 is a mapping from {0, 1} * to G 1 and the order of G 1 is q, so the length of all the public keys is logq. The private keys are computed from the master key s ∈ Z * q and the public key, so the size of private keys is logq. Therefore, the storage overhead for each group user is 2logq, which is a constant number.
All the computation in the procedure of Key Recovery is as follows: (1) Solving a set of linear equations with |G j | variables; (2) |G j | + 1 scalar multiplications in the group G 1 ; (3) |G j | additions in the group G 1 ; (4) Three pairings computation. One is for the verification of signature and the other two for recovering the session key; (5) One hashing computation; (6) One XOR operation. Generally speaking, bilinear pairing computation is more time-consuming than scalar multiplication, let alone addition, hash and XOR operation. Therefore, the main computation overhead comes form (4) .
The communication overhead comes from ciphertext B j = {z 1 , . . . , z j } and the signature Sign j . z j is composed of U i (1 ≤ i ≤ |G j |) and V j . The size of U i (1 ≤ i ≤ |G j |) is 2logq and the size of V j is logq bits. Therefore, the length of z j equals to (2|G j | + 1)logq, which is increases in direct proportion to |G j |. The signature Sign j = 1 H(Bj )+s P is a point in G 1 , so the bit size of the signature is 2logq. Consequently, the bit size of broadcast message is [ j i=1 2|G i | + (j + 2)]logq, which is related to the total number of users in all the communication group j i=1 |G i | and increases in direct proportion to the sequence of session j. In fact, this is the shortcoming of this scheme. In future works, we will address this problem and find ways to shorten the length of broadcast messages.
VI. CONCLUSION
An authenticated pairing-based self-healing key distribution scheme is proposed in this paper. The new scheme achieves good features. Above all, the short signature keeps the integrity and correctness of the ciphertext without introducing too much computation overhead. Secondly, the scheme is collusion-free for any coalition of non-authorized users, private key has nothing to do with the number of revoked users and can be reused as long as it is not disclosed. While in secret sharing-based self-healing key distribution schemes, the personal key can be reused on the condition that less than threshold number users are revoked. At the same time, the constant storage overhead is kept in this scheme. Furthermore, session keys are independent to each other and according to uniform distribution and thus forward security and backward security are kept. In addition, our scheme enables a user to recover from a single broadcast message all session keys for the corresponding session groups which it belongs to.
